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Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater 
Abstract. According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of  perception, 
perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of  the external 
world.  Instead, when you look out to see a red wall, what you learn first is 
not a fact about the color of  the wall—i.e., that it is red—but instead a fact 
about your own visual experience—i.e., that the wall looks red to you.  If  you 
are to justifiably believe that the wall is red, you must be in a position to 
justifiably infer this conclusion about the external world from known 
premises about your own visual experience.  Recent anti-Cartesian theorists 
have pushed back against this traditional model, claiming that the epistemic 
significance of  having a perceptual experience is not exhausted by what can 
be inferred from the fact that you have the experience.  After clarifying an 
underappreciated commitment of  Cartesian accounts and some key 
motivations for resisting it, I argue that any anti-Cartesian account strong 
enough to take advantage of  these motivations must license a way of  
updating one’s beliefs in response to anticipated experiences that seems 
diachronically irrational.  To avoid this implausible result, the anti-Cartesian 
must choose between licensing an implausible kind of  epistemic chauvinism, 
or else claiming that merely reflecting on one’s experiences can defeat the 
perceptual justification that they otherwise provide.  This leaves us with a 
puzzle:  Although there are powerful motivations for rejecting Cartesianism, 
any view that avails itself  of  them faces serious problems of  its own. 
1.  Background 
According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of  perception, perception does not 
provide one with direct knowledge of  the external world.  Instead, when you look out to see 
a red wall, what you learn first is not a fact about the color of  the wall—i.e., that it is red—
but instead a fact about your own visual experience—i.e., that the wall looks red to you.  If  
you are to know or to justifiably believe that the wall is red, then you must be in a position to 
justifiably infer this conclusion about the external world from known premises about your 
own visual experience.  1
The Cartesian account is sometimes accused of  treating ordinary perception on the model 
of  a “Cartesian theater,” with perceptual experiences playing the role of  mere images 
displayed before an internal spectator.  As I will explain, I think there is some truth to the 
accusation.  What is less clear to me is how this seemingly unappealing model of  perceptual 
justification can be avoided.  For even though there are powerful motivations for rejecting 
the Cartesian account, any alternative view strong enough to appeal to these motivations 
faces serious problems of  its own.  My aim in what follows is to explain an underappreciated 
commitment of  the Cartesian account, some motivations for resisting the account, and the 
problem that confronts any view that takes advantage of  these motivations. 
 The Cartesian view is so called because it is inspired by Descartes’ treatment of  perceptual skepticism, though 1
it arguably goes beyond anything he said.  For classic examples, see, e.g., (Chisholm, 1966) and (Russell, 1912).
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The underappreciated commitment of  the Cartesian account concerns the following 
question:  Why does what you are justified in believing depend on your perceptual 
experiences, while what I am justified in believing depends on my perceptual experiences? 
The Cartesian, I claim, is committed to the following answer:  It is because you know what 
your own experiences are, but you typically do not know what mine are (and vice versa for 
me).  And this answer commits the Cartesian to claiming that, to whatever extent you do 
happen to know what my perceptual experiences are, my experiences will justify your beliefs 
in the same way and to the same degree that your own experiences do.  After explaining all 
of  this in Sections 2 and 3 below, I will go on in Section 4 to discuss the problem facing 
accounts of  perceptual justification that follow me in rejecting these Cartesian claims. 
But first, I want to consider briefly the more familiar landscape of  issues surrounding the 
Cartesian epistemology of  perception.  We can start by considering the epistemic situation 
of  an agent who really is in a Cartesian theater: 
(CARTESIAN THEATER) You find yourself  in a windowless room, which is 
empty aside from a closed-circuit TV.  The TV is hooked up to a camera that 
is located elsewhere, where it faces a wall of  an unknown color.  When the 
TV is switched on, it displays an image of  a red wall.  You have strong reason 
to believe that the images on the TV are a reliable guide to the color of  the 
wall, and as a matter of  fact the images are both accurate and reliably 
generated. 
It should be uncontroversial that you are justified in believing that the wall is red in 
CARTESIAN THEATER.  And in broad outline, it should also uncontroversial why you are 
justified.  Your only access to the color of  the wall comes from the images that you see on 
your TV screen.  So you are justified in believing that the wall is red only because you are in a 
position to justifiably infer that the wall is red from what you know about these images.   This 2
of  course does not mean that you must consciously go through such an inference.  But it 
plausibly does mean that you must be in a position justifiably to do so. 
Since you must be in a position to justifiably infer the color of  the wall from known 
premises about the images on your TV screen, this lends credibility to some further familiar 
claims.  First, it is plausible that you still would have been justified in believing that the wall is 
red even if  the images on your TV had been inaccurate, and even if  the process that 
generated them had been objectively unreliable.  For you would have the same evidence 
either way.  Second, it is plausible that you would not have been justified in believing that the 
wall is red if  you had lacked background evidence supporting the reliability of  the images on 
the TV screen.  For it is plausible that one cannot justifiably infer from premises about the 
images to conclusions about the wall unless one has evidence supporting that the former is a 
reliable guide to the latter. 
To be sure, both of  these further claims are controversial.  Some reliabilists about inferential 
justification, for example, would deny them both.  I think we should accept both of  these 
claims, as I have argued elsewhere.   But instead of  discussing these claims in more detail 3
 For simplicity, I ignore the view that by looking at the images, one can see the wall itself.  See (Briscoe, MS 2
Sec. 5) for critical discussion of  a view like this.  Those sympathetic to such a view could substitute an example 
where you receive non-imagistic information about the color of  a wall.
 See especially (Barnett, 2014) and (Barnett, 2015).3
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here, I want to instead examine a prominent way of  resisting a traditional Cartesian 
epistemology of  perception that is willing to grant these claims about Cartesian theaters, and 
that instead denies that ordinary perception puts us in a comparable situation. 
Consider a corresponding case of  ordinary visual perception: 
(VISUAL PERCEPTION) You look at a wall, and see that it is red.  You have 
strong reason to believe that your visual experiences are reliable. 
Although some radical skeptics might deny that it is possible to have strong reason to believe 
that one’s visual experiences are reliable, it should be uncontroversial that if  VISUAL 
PERCEPTION is possible, then in it you are justified in believing that the wall is red.  What is 
controversial is how to explain why you is justified. 
I take the the Cartesian account to be this.  When you look at a red wall, what you learn first 
is a fact about your own mind; the fact that you are having an experience as of  a red wall 
(henceforth: a reddish experience).   This reddish experience itself  does not give you 4
justification to believe that the wall is red, anymore than a red image on a TV screen does. 
Instead, it is your knowledge that you have this experience which puts you in a position to 
justifiably infer that the wall is red, just as knowledge of  the red image does in CARTESIAN 
THEATER. 
If  we accept this Cartesian account of  why you are justified (and accept the plausible but 
controversial further claims about Cartesian theaters above), then this will leave us with two 
familiar corollaries.  The first is: 
(PERCEPTUAL INTERNALISM) Genuinely perceiving never gives one stronger 
(or weaker) justification for one’s perceptual beliefs than merely seeming to 
perceive does. 
The idea behind PERCEPTUAL INTERNALISM is that someone who is hallucinating, or who 
otherwise has the same experiences as a genuine perceiver, is as justified in her perceptual 
beliefs as the perceiver is.  This is plausibly a consequence of  the Cartesian account because 
both the perceiver and the hallucinator will be in the position of  having to infer conclusions 
about the external world from the same body of  evidence. 
The second corollary is: 
(PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM) One is never justified in believing what one 
perceives unless one has independent evidence that one’s perceptual 
experiences are reliable. 
This is plausibly a consequence of  the Cartesian account because it is natural to think that 
one would need a corresponding kind of  evidence in order to justifiably infer that the wall is 
red from one’s knowledge that there is a red image on a TV screen.  If  the Cartesian is right 
that ordinary perception requires one to make inferences from knowledge of  one’s 
experiences, then this plausibly will require corresponding independent evidence supporting 
the reliability of  perception.  (See Section 3.1 below for more on this controversial matter.) 
 A disjunctivist can read my talk of  having a reddish experience as shorthand for a disjunction, such that an 4
agent has a reddish experience if  she either sees a red wall or (merely) seems to see a red wall.
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Recent anti-Cartesian theorists, however, have pushed back against this traditional account. 
These anti-Cartesians do not merely deny the psychological claim that we go around 
introspecting our experiences and drawing inferences from the introspected premises. 
Instead, they think that the epistemology of  perception is anti-Cartesian in a deeper sense. 
In their view, your knowledge of  your experiences is not what justifies perceptual beliefs. 
Instead, certain perceptual states contribute to your perceptual justification in a way that is 
not exhausted by whatever inferences you can draw from your knowledge of  your 
experiences. 
Very often, these opponents of  Cartesianism also seek to reject one or both of  
Cartesianism’s familiar corollaries.  Take, for example, dogmatists and phenomenal 
conservatives.   These anti-Cartesians are motivated in part by a desire to reject PERCEPTUAL 5
INCREDULISM, which they see as leading to an untenable skepticism about perception. 
Roughly speaking, their idea is that because one’s perceptual experiences themselves can 
provide a distinctive form of  immediate justification not acknowledged by the Cartesian 
account, they can give you stronger justification for your perceptual beliefs that what the 
Cartesian account predicts.  We will consider how this might give anti-Cartesians an anti-
skeptical advantage over Cartesianism in Section 3.1 below. 
Other anti-Cartesians, such as epistemological disjunctivists, go even further in their 
rejection of  the traditional Cartesian account, and deny that the perceptual states most 
directly involved in perceptual justification are experiences.   They claim instead that the 6
relevant perceptual states are factive states like seeing.  Because these factive states are absent 
in cases of  hallucination, these anti-Cartesians reject not only PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM 
but PERCEPTUAL INTERNALISM as well. 
Although externalist versions of  anti-Cartesianism like disjunctivism are important, our 
discussion will focus more directly on internalist versions.  This is because the contrast with 
Cartesianism of  greatest concern to us arises even without rejecting the Cartesian view that 
the perceptual states most directly involved in perceptual justification are (non-factive) 
experiences.  Even so, much of  what I will say should extend to externalist anti-Cartesian 
views as well.  And I will highlight a few places where the differences between internalist and 
externalist forms of  anti-Cartesianism are important. 
It is important that even though both of  these familiar forms of  anti-Cartesianism reject 
PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM, that is not something that I build into the view.  Instead, anti-
Cartesianism as I define it is a view about the explanation of  perceptual justification.  It says 
that perceptual states themselves can justify beliefs, and that their involvement in the 
justification of  one’s beliefs need not always consist in their serving as evidence from which 
the beliefs are inferred.  As we go on, I will have more to say about the additional 
commitments I think the anti-Cartesian ought to take on, including PERCEPTUAL 
INCREDULISM.  But for now, I define anti-Cartesianism in a minimal way, so that I must 
work to explain why it should take the more specific form I favor. 
 See, e.g., (Brogaard, 2013), (Brown, 2013), (Cohen, 2010), (Cullison, 2010), (Huemer, 2006 and 2007), (Jehle 5
and Weatherson, 2012), (Kung, 2010), (Lycan, 2013), (Moretti, 2015), (Pollock and Cruz, 1999), (Pryor, 2000 
and 2013), (Silins, 2008), (Tucker, 2010 and 2013), (Weatherson, 2007), and (Wedgwood, 2013), among many 
others.  Note that while anti-Cartesianism is often coupled with a Moorean reply to the skeptic, this is not 
something I build in to the view.
 See, e.g., (McDowell, 1982 and 1995) and (Pritchard, 2012), and see (Soteriou, 2014) for a helpful review.6
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2.  Anti-Cartesianism and Perceptual Partiality 
It is time to consider an underappreciated point of  contrast between Cartesianism and anti-
Cartesianism.  The contrast concerns how each view explains the distinctive epistemic 
significance of  one’s own experiences.  Both views can accept the datum that the 
justification of  one’s beliefs depends more directly on one’s own experiences than it does on 
another person’s.  But they explain this datum in different ways.  The Cartesian’s explanation, 
I will claim, commits the Cartesian to what I call PERCEPTUAL IMPARTIALITY.  And as I go 
on to explain in Section 3.1, the Cartesian’s commitment to the more familiar PERCEPTUAL 
INCREDULISM is a byproduct of  this prior commitment. 
We can start by again comparing a pair of  examples, one involving a Cartesian theater, and 
the other involving ordinary perception.  Here is the first: 
(TWO SPECTATORS) You are in a windowless room, which is empty aside 
from a closed-circuit TV.  The TV is is hooked up to a camera that is located 
elsewhere, where it faces a wall of  an unknown color.  Another camera also 
faces the same wall.  This camera is connected to a different closed-circuit 
TV, which sits in a different windowless room, which is occupied by a 
different person, who we will call ‘Other’.  Your evidence concerning the 
reliability of  your own and Other’s TVs are on a par, in the sense that for any 
evidence you have concerning your own, you have corresponding evidence 
concerning Other’s.  At the moment, both TVs are turned off.  But pretty 
soon, exactly one of  the TVs will be turned on.  You know all of  this. 
Consider some claims about this example that should be uncontroversial.  The first is that 
there is an asymmetry between the epistemic significance for you of  images on your TV 
screen and of  images on Other’s.  In particular, if  your TV screen is the one that is turned 
on, and if  it displays an image of  a red wall, then this can result in your having some 
justification to believe that the wall is red.  How much justification it gives you will depend 
on your background evidence concerning factors like the reliability of  the images on your 
TV.  But regardless of  how these details of  the example are filled in, the important point is 
that the images on your TV screen have the potential to affect your justification to believe 
that the wall is red.  If  instead Other’s TV is turned on, and Other’s TV displays an image of  
a red wall, then this will not result in your having any reason to believe that the wall is red. 
In short, the images on your TV screen can affect your justification for believing the wall is 
red in a way that the images on Other’s TV do not.  And this is true even though your 
evidence concerning the reliability of  Other’s TV is on a par with your evidence concerning 
your own.  A second uncontroversial claim concerns the explanation of  this asymmetry. 
The explanation is simply that you are in a position to know what images are displayed on 
your TV screen—you can see them!—but you are in no position to know what is displayed 
on Other’s TV screen.  Because you could know what you images are on your TV, you could 
be in a position to infer conclusions about the color of  the wall from them.  But you are in 
no position to infer conclusions from the images on Other’s TV, for the simple reason that 
you would not know what they are.  Thus the asymmetry in the epistemic significance of  the 
images is explained by an asymmetry in access; the images on your TV screen affect what you 
are justified in believing simply because you are in a position to know what they are. 
This explanation has some important consequences for a situation in which you are able to 
learn about the images on Other’s TV screen in some way other than by seeing—for 
example, where Other is able to tell you what he sees on his TV screen.  The consequence is 
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that if  this other way of  knowing about Other’s images confers knowledge with the same 
degree of  epistemic security that one gets by seeing, then it would give you just as much 
justification to believe that the wall is red as you get from seeing the same images on your 
own TV screen.  And moreover, even if  your alternative way of  accessing Other’s TV screen 
confers less secure knowledge than seeing does, it will give you less justification to believe 
the wall is red only to the extent that your knowledge of  the images on his TV screen is less 
secure.  (We will discuss this further in Section 4.1.) 
These consequences follow because by stipulation you have no evidence supporting the 
reliability of  your TV over Other’s.  If  you nevertheless received stronger justification from 
seeing your own TV’s images, this would mean that you could be justified in placing greater 
confidence in them than in Other’s (e.g., by believing what you see on your TV while holding 
back from believing what you know is displayed on Other’s).  But that would amount to a 
kind of  irrational chauvinism.  For you would be counting the images on your TV as 
stronger evidence of  the truth, simply because that TV is yours. 
Plausibly, everyone should accept these claims about Cartesian theaters.  But turn now to the 
second example involving ordinary perception, over which Cartesian and anti-Cartesian 
views conflict: 
(TWO PERCEIVERS) You and Other are facing a wall of  an unknown color. 
Your evidence concerning the reliability of  your own and Other’s visual 
faculties are on a par, in the sense that for any evidence you have concerning 
your own, you have corresponding evidence concerning Other’s.  You are 
both wearing blindfolds, but pretty soon, exactly one of  you will have his or 
her blindfold removed.  You know all of  this. 
It should be uncontroversial that if  you go on to have your blindfold removed, and if  you 
have a reddish experience, then this can give you some reason to believe that the wall is red. 
Whether it gives you sufficient reason to justify belief  that the wall is red will depend on 
your background evidence about factors like the reliability of  your vision.  But the important 
point for now is simply that your experiences can have a positive epistemic impact on your 
justification to believe that the wall is red.  If  instead it is Other’s blindfold that is removed, 
and if  Other is the one who has the reddish experience, then this will not give you any 
reason to believe that the wall is red.  And this remains true even though your evidence 
concerning Other’s visual reliability is entirely on a par with evidence about your own.  Thus 
it should be uncontroversial that your own experience can asymmetrically affect what you are 
justified in believing in this way.  What Cartesians and anti-Cartesians disagree about is the 
explanation of  this asymmetry. 
The Cartesian about perception must explain this asymmetry in the same way that we 
explain the corresponding asymmetry in TWO SPECTATORS.  That is, the Cartesian must say 
that your perceptual experiences asymmetrically affect your justification simply because you 
have a special kind of  access to facts about your experiences.  In TWO SPECTATORS, you 
know about the images on your TV screen because you can see them, while in TWO 
PERCEIVERS, you know about your own experiences not by seeing but instead in a special 
introspective way.  But despite this difference, the Cartesian thinks that these cases have in 
common that the asymmetry in epistemic significance is explained by an asymmetry in 
access.  This is because the Cartesian thinks that the contribution made to one’s perceptual 
justification by perceptual experience is exhausted by one’s knowledge of  those experiences. 
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Notice some apparent consequences of  the Cartesian explanation.  Since the Cartesian 
explains the epistemic asymmetry by an asymmetry in access, the Cartesian is committed to 
granting that if  you somehow could have equally secure access to what Other’s visual 
experiences are, this would give you the same degree of  justification to believe that the wall 
is red as you get from your own experiences.  And even if  it is not possible for you to have 
equally secure access to Other’s experiences as you have to your own, it remains true that 
you get less justification from knowledge of  Other’s experiences only to the extent that your 
access to those experiences is less secure. 
These consequences follow from the Cartesian explanation because by stipulation you have 
no evidence supporting the reliability of  your experiences over Other’s.  For this reason, it 
would seem irrationally chauvinistic to count your own experiences as stronger evidence of  
the truth, by placing greater confidence in any conclusions you might infer from what you 
know about them.  The Cartesian thus must accept these consequences, on pain of  licensing 
irrational chauvinism as justified.  7
In Section 1 above, we noted two familiar corollaries of  Cartesianism, PERCEPTUAL 
INCREDULISM and PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM.  We are now ready to introduce a less 
familiar, though in my view no less important, third corollary: 
(PERCEPTUAL IMPARTIALITY) Having a perceptual experience can never give 
you substantially stronger justification for a perceptual belief  than you would 
get from knowing that another person has had such an experience. 
Note that PERCEPTUAL IMPARTIALITY says that you cannot receive substantially stronger 
justification from your own experiences than you would get from knowledge of  another 
person’s.  For a Cartesian can plausibly claim that your own experiences give you slightly 
stronger justification, for the simple reason that that you plausibly never can be quite as 
certain of  another person’s experiences as you are of  your own.  What the Cartesian seems 
unable to accept is that even to the extent that you can know another person’s experiences, 
this knowledge still does not confer the same degree of  justification as you get from your 
own experiences.  For again, it would seem irrationally chauvinistic to count one’s own 
experiences as stronger evidence of  the truth than another person’s experiences, unless you 
have some evidence suggesting that your experiences really do amount to more reliable 
evidence. 
Turn now to the anti-Cartesian, who claims that your merely having a reddish experience can 
give you justification to believe that the wall is red, in a way that is not fully accounted for by 
your knowledge of  those experiences.  Now the anti-Cartesian does not deny that you do 
have a special way of  knowing your own experiences.  It is obvious that you do!  What the 
anti-Cartesian denies is that this asymmetry in knowledge fully explains why your own 
experiences have an epistemic significance for you that Other’s do not have.  Nor does the 
anti-Cartesian need to deny that your knowledge of  your own reddish experience can give 
you even more justification to believe that the wall is red, in addition to what you get just by 
having the experience—although some anti-Cartesians might wish to deny this.   What the 8
anti-Cartesian says is simply that having a reddish experience gives you some justification all 
on its own. 
 But see Section 4.2 below for one way the Cartesian might try to deflect this charge of  chauvinism.7
 See, e.g., (Lasonen-Aarnio, 2015) for a corresponding issue concerning belief.8
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The Cartesian and anti-Cartesian thus disagree in the first instance about why your perceptual 
beliefs are justified, in cases where they are justified.  But in disagreeing with the Cartesian’s 
account of  why perceptual beliefs are justified, the anti-Cartesian opens the door for 
sometimes disagreeing with the Cartesian about whether your perceptual beliefs are justified in 
particular cases.  In particular, it allows the anti-Cartesian to hold that there are cases where 
having a reddish experience can give you substantially stronger justification for a perceptual 
belief  than you would get from merely knowing that Other has had such an experience.  In 
other words, it allows the anti-Cartesian to deny PERCEPTUAL IMPARTIALITY, and accept the 
contradictory claim that: 
(PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY) Having a perceptual experience can sometimes 
give you substantially stronger justification for a perceptual belief  than you 
would get from knowing that another person has had such an experience. 
We have already seen that the Cartesian must deny a thesis like this, on pain of  licensing an 
irrational form of  chauvinism as justified.  But perhaps it might seem that any view accepting 
PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY, including an anti-Cartesian one, must be guilty of  the same kind 
of  chauvinism.  If  I believe what I seem to see, but am less willing to believe what I know 
that you seem to see, aren’t I in an important sense counting my own experience as stronger 
evidence than yours?  I think this is not so obvious. 
Consider first what an externalist anti-Cartesian (like a disjunctivist) might say to deflect the 
charge of  chauvinism.  She might say that what you are justified in believing depends on the 
available evidence, which includes all of  the facts that you know.  When you know that some 
other person has a reddish experience, then the fact that he has this experience is included in 
your available evidence.  And perhaps when you yourself  see a red wall, you might also know 
that you have a reddish experience, and hence have this fact included in your available 
evidence.  It indeed would be irrationally chauvinistic to count this bit of  the available 
evidence as stronger evidence of  the truth than the fact that another person has a similar 
experience.  But that kind of  chauvinism need not be involved in believing what you see. 
For when you see that the wall is red, the fact that the wall is red also is included in your 
available evidence.  And there is nothing chauvinistic about taking this fact to better support 
that the wall is red than any facts about an agent’s experiences do. 
I think the internalist anti-Cartesian has a similar way of  deflecting the charge of  
chauvinism.  For she might say that what you are justified in believing depends upon the 
apparent evidence, which includes not only the facts that you know, but also the other things 
that appear to be facts from your point of  view.  When you know that another person seems 
to see a red wall, this fact about his experience is included in your apparent evidence.  But 
when you yourself  seem to see a red wall, your apparent evidence includes the apparent fact 
that the wall is red.  Again, there is nothing chauvinistic about counting this apparent fact as 
stronger evidence that the wall is red than apparent facts that merely concern a given 
person’s experiences.  9
Of  course, it might still be worried that these sorts of  moves do not really avoid 
commitment to an implausible chauvinism, at least for reflective perceivers like us.  For we 
are in a position to reflect on our own experiences, and recognize that they are as capable of  
error as anyone else’s.  And even if  we do not infer conclusions about the world from 
 For related thoughts on the epistemology of  intuitions, see (Wedgwood 2007, Chs. 10 and 11).9
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premises about those experiences, as the Cartesian alleges, there presumably is some further 
sense in which we only hold the perceptual beliefs we do as a result of  our experiences. 
Since we are in a position to appreciate all of  this on reflection, the worry goes, we are still 
guilty of  irrational chauvinism if  we nevertheless place more confidence in our ordinary 
perceptual beliefs than we would in the conclusions we might infer from another person’s 
experiences. 
I have a great deal of  sympathy for this worry.  Indeed, in Section 4 I will press a problem 
for anti-Cartesianism that I see as closely related to it.  All I claim here is that it is not just 
obvious that an anti-Cartesian that accepts PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY must license the kind of  
flagrant chauvinism that a Cartesian view would need to.  Perhaps in the end the anti-
Cartesian who accepts PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY is committed to licensing irrational 
chauvinism.  But it takes work to show it. 
3.  Motivations for Anti-Cartesianism 
We have just seen that the Cartesian cannot plausibly accept PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY, but 
that it might be open to the anti-Cartesian to do so.  In Section 4 below, I will press a 
problem for anti-Cartesianism that stems from PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY.  But before doing 
so, I need to say more to strengthen the association between anti-Cartesianism and 
PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY.  For even though PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY seems open to the 
anti-Cartesian, this does not mean that the anti-Cartesian must accept PERCEPTUAL 
PARTIALITY.  For one thing, anti-Cartesianism as I have defined it is compatible with the 
unusual view that having perceptual experiences always gives you weaker justification than 
you would get from merely knowing about another person’s perceptual experiences.  More 
importantly,  an anti-Cartesian might hold that while having a perceptual experience gives 
you a different kind of  justification than you would get from merely knowing of  another’s 
experiences, you always get the same overall strength of  justification from both sources. 
To strengthen the connection between anti-Cartesianism and PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY, we 
will consider two core motivations for rejecting Cartesianism.  These motivations, if  they 
succeed at all, succeed in motivating a form of  anti-Cartesianism that accepts PERCEPTUAL 
PARTIALITY.  The upshot is that an anti-Cartesian who appeals to these motivations must 
accept PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY. 
3.1  First Motivation:  Anti-Skeptical Advantages 
Recall PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM, the claim that one cannot be justified in believing what 
one perceives without independent evidence that one’s perceptual experiences are reliable. 
One familiar motivation for anti-Cartesianism holds that the Cartesian is committed to 
PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM, and that this in turn leads to skepticism.  For this reason, the 
motivation goes, anti-Cartesianism enjoys an anti-skeptical advantage over Cartesianism. 
Here I will briefly survey why anti-Cartesianism might enjoy this advantage.  In doing so, my 
purpose is not to develop a novel motivation for anti-Cartesianism, or to settle whether it 
ultimately succeeds.  Instead, I aim merely to highlight that this familiar motivation, if  it 
succeeds at all, succeeds at motivating a form of  anti-Cartesian that embraces PERCEPTUAL 
PARTIALITY. 
First consider why it is difficult to avoid perceptual skepticism without rejecting 
PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM.  If  one’s ordinary perceptual beliefs are to be justified, then 
under PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM one must have independent evidence supporting that 
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one’s perceptual experiences are reliable.  The relevant notion of  ‘independence’ here can be 
slippery.  But the idea is that one’s evidence supporting the reliability of  perception cannot 
itself  derive from perception, on pain of  vicious circularity.   This raises a problem, because 10
it is hard to see how we might have perception-independent evidence concerning the deeply 
contingent matter of  whether our perceptual experiences are reliable.  And for this reason, it 
is natural to think that our ordinary perceptual beliefs can be justified only if  PERCEPTUAL 
INCREDULISM is false. 
This sketch of  why PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM might lead to skepticism is open to 
question.  But it at least has strong prima facie plausibility.  The anti-skeptical motivation for 
anti-Cartesianism assumes that it is correct, and goes on to allege that the Cartesian is 
committed to PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM. 
To see why the Cartesian, who treats perceptual justification on the model of  a Cartesian 
theater, is arguably committed to PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM, consider again a simple case 
in which you find yourself  in a Cartesian theater, observing a red image on your TV screen. 
As we noted in Section 1 above, it is very appealing to accept the following thesis about such 
a case: 
(TV IMAGE INCREDULISM) One cannot be justified in inferring conclusions 
about the world from premises about TV images unless one has independent 
evidence that the TV images are reliable. 
The problem for Cartesians is that they treat ordinary perception on the model of  a 
Cartesian theater.  So if  they accept the appealing thesis of  TV IMAGE INCREDULISM, they 
have trouble rejecting PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM.  For if  inferring from premises about TV 
images to conclusions about the external world requires independent evidence that the TV 
images are reliable, then plausibly the same should go for corresponding inferences from 
premises about one’s perceptual experiences.   Otherwise, one could count one’s 11
experiences as stronger evidence than a TV’s images, even when one lacks evidence 
supporting that the experiences are more reliable than the images.  And this seems to 
amount to an irrational kind of  chauvinism. 
The Cartesian might resist this apparent commitment to PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM by 
denying TV IMAGE INCREDULISM.  For example, a reliabilist might say that one can be 
justified in inferring from premises about the TV images to conclusions about the world so 
long as the images are objectively reliable, and so long as one has no defeaters.  A reliabilist 
view like this could still qualify as ‘Cartesian’ in my sense, and yet face no obvious skeptical 
problems.  Traditional Cartesians, however, reject reliabilism and other views that might deny 
TV IMAGE INCREDULISM, as I argue elsewhere we all should.   The anti-skeptical advantage 12
claimed by anti-Cartesians is an advantage over these traditional Cartesians. 
The only other way to resist PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM is by distinguishing in some way 
between ordinary perception and a Cartesian theater, in order to accept incredulism about 
 See, e.g., (Barnett, 2014) for further discussion.10
 Cf. (Foley, 2001 and 2005) and (Zagzebski, 2012 Chs. 2 and 3), which I read as saying that one has non-11
evidential reasons to trust the beliefs and experiences of  other people.
 See especially (Barnett, 2014).12
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the the latter but not the former.  And this is where the Cartesian faces problems that the 
anti-Cartesian does not.  For the Cartesian account holds that perception puts one in the 
position of  having to infer conclusions about the world from known premises about one’s 
experiences, just as in a Cartesian theater one might infer conclusions about the world from 
known premises about the images on a TV.  If  that is accepted, then it is hard to see how 
further differences between the cases could be of  assistance.  We already have seen that the 
Cartesian has a difficult time accepting PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY without licensing obvious 
chauvinism.  And this means that if  she rejects PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM, then she is 
committed to rejecting a corresponding claim concerning a case where one must infer 
conclusions about the world from premises about another person’s experiences.  That is, she 
is committed to rejecting: 
(OTHER PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCES INCREDULISM) One cannot be justified in 
inferring conclusions about the world from premises about another person’s 
experiences unless one has independent evidence that those experiences are 
reliable. 
The Cartesian would thus need to reject OTHER PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCES INCREDULISM 
while accepting TV IMAGE INCREDULISM.  But this would seem to simply commit her to a 
different kind of  objectionable chauvinism.  For if  one has no evidence suggesting that an 
agent’s experiences are more reliable than a TV’s images, it would seem illegitimately 
chauvinistic to nevertheless count the experiences as stronger evidence than the images. 
The Cartesian thus faces a prima facie skeptical problem.  It is plausible that we must reject 
PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM if  we are to avoid skepticism.  But the Cartesian has difficulty 
doing so.  For it is plausible that a spectator in a Cartesian theater cannot justifiably infer 
conclusions about the world unless he has independent evidence that the images on his TV 
are reliable.  And since the Cartesian treats ordinary perception on the model of  a Cartesian 
theater, she has difficulty accepting this incredulist claim about Cartesian theaters without 
also accepting a corresponding incredulism about perception. 
This is where the anti-Cartesian can plausibly claim an anti-skeptical advantage over the 
Cartesian.  For the anti-Cartesian more plausibly can distinguish between ordinary 
perception and a Cartesian theater, accepting an incredulist view about the latter but not the 
former.  This is because the anti-Cartesian denies that ordinary perception requires us to 
make inferences from premises about our own perceptual experiences.  For this reason, the 
anti-Cartesian plausibly can avoid commitment to PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM, even while 
granting that independent evidence for the reliability of  the TV images would be required by 
a spectator in a Cartesian theater.  Indeed, the anti-Cartesian can grant that we would need 
independent evidence for the reliability of  perception if  we were in the position of  having to 
infer our ordinary perceptual beliefs from premises about them.  For again, the anti-
Cartesian denies that ordinary perception puts us in the position of  having to make such 
inferences. 
This anti-skeptical motivation for anti-Cartesianism is by no means beyond question. 
Perhaps the Cartesian could find a way to avoid PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM after all, or else 
of  accepting it without falling into skepticism.  Alternatively, perhaps it could be claimed that 
the anti-Cartesian cannot ultimately succeed in resisting skepticism, either.  I do not hope to 
settle these matters here.  Instead, I want to emphasize only that if  the anti-Cartesian does 
enjoy this anti-skeptical advantage over the Cartesian, this is only because the anti-Cartesian 
is better positioned to accept PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY.  For the anti-Cartesian is in no 
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better position than the Cartesian to distinguish between inferences from premises about TV 
images and inferences from premises about an agent’s experiences.  And so the anti-
Cartesian is in no better position to accept TV IMAGE INCREDULISM and reject OTHER 
PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCES INCREDULISM.  Rather, the anti-Cartesian’s advantage comes in 
distinguishing ordinary perception from a case where one infers conclusions about the world 
from premises about an agent’s experiences.  This arguably could enable the anti-Cartesian, 
unlike the Cartesian, to accept OTHER PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCES INCREDULISM while 
rejecting PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM.  In doing so, the anti-Cartesian must hold that one 
sometimes can be justified in one’s perceptual beliefs even though one would not be justified 
in inferring conclusions about the world from premises about another agent’s experiences. 
And this means accepting PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY. 
3.2  Second Motivation:  We Can’t be Cartesians “All the Way Down”. 
The second motivation for anti-Cartesianism appeals to the following observation:  We 
cannot be Cartesians “all the way down”.  Specifically, we cannot plausibly extend 
Cartesianism from perceptual experience to other states like belief  and knowledge.   For it 13
is not plausible that the justification of  your beliefs depends on your own beliefs and 
knowledge only in the way that it can depend on another person’s.  After explaining why, I 
will discuss how this might support anti-Cartesianism about perception. 
Consider first Cartesianism about knowledge itself.   The Cartesian about knowledge takes 14
what the perceptual Cartesian said about perceptual experiences, and extends it to 
knowledge.  The perceptual Cartesian denied that perceptual experiences themselves can 
directly affect what one is justified in believing.  Whenever experiences are involved in the 
justification of  a belief, it is only indirectly, in virtue of  one’s knowledge of  the experiences 
giving one inferential justification for the belief.  If  we try to extend these claims to 
knowledge itself, however, it leads to a contradiction. 
It is clear that knowledge can at least be indirectly involved in the justification of  one’s 
beliefs.  For example, suppose you have background knowledge that a picnic will be 
cancelled if  it rains, and you gain new knowledge that it will rain.  Surely this can at least 
result indirectly in your being justified in believing that the picnic will be cancelled.  Yet by 
stipulation, the Cartesian about knowledge would deny that your knowledge that it will rain 
is what gives you justification to believe that the picnic will be cancelled.  Instead, she says 
that what gives you justification must be your higher-order knowledge that you know this. 
But at the same time, the Cartesian about knowledge also denies that your higher-order 
knowledge can give you justification to believe the picnic will be cancelled, for the same 
reason.  Thus Cartesianism about knowledge itself  is inconsistent. 
This quick refutation applies only to a general Cartesianism about knowledge, which by 
stipulation denies that any knowledge, even higher-order knowledge, can directly give one 
justification for beliefs.  It leaves open more restricted Cartesian views about belief  and 
 See also (Brown, 2013) and (Wedgwood, 2007, Chs. 10 and 11) for anti-Cartesianism about intuitions, and 13
Pollock and Cruz (1999) for anti-Cartesianism about memory experiences.  And see (Robson, 2012) for a 
review of  loosely related issues concerning aesthetic experience, including Wollheim’s (1980, p.233) 
Acquaintance Principle.
 The view is so called with apologies to Descartes, who I interpret as anti-Cartesian about clear and distinct 14
perceptions that he took to be necessary and sufficient for knowledge (Barnett, MS).
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knowledge.  But the quick refutation is enough to show that we cannot be Cartesians “all the 
way down”.  For some mental or epistemic states, just being in those states affects what one 
is justified in believing.  Their epistemic significance is not always exhausted by the 
inferential justification provided by knowledge that one is in them.  Even a Cartesian about 
other states must admit that some states of  higher-order knowledge are states of  this kind. 
So the issue is not whether mental states can affect one’s justification in this way, but instead 
simply which ones do. 
Now there are a number of  possible views that are anti-Cartesian about higher-order 
knowledge, but that adopt Cartesianism about other states of  knowledge and belief.  While I 
think all these views face similar problems, I will focus on a particular view that is inspired 
by recent debates over peer disagreement and higher-order evidence.  The view, which I call 
‘Cartesianism about belief ’ holds that neither first-order beliefs nor first-order knowledge 
directly give one justification for further beliefs.  Instead, when you have a belief  that is 
supported by your first-order evidence, this can affect what justification you have for further 
beliefs only in virtue of  what you can justifiably infer from your knowledge that you have the 
belief.  15
Like Cartesianism about perception, Cartesianism about belief  is a view about why particular 
mental states affect your justification for further beliefs.  But unlike Cartesianism about 
perception, any explanation it could offer faces an immediate problem.  For consider what it 
says about a simple case where you know that a picnic will be cancelled if  it rains, and then 
come justifiably to believe that it will rain.  Surely this too can at least result indirectly in your 
having justification to believe that the picnic will be cancelled.  But the Cartesian denies that 
justifiably believing that it will rain can be what directly gives you justification to believe that 
the picnic is cancelled.  Instead, it is your knowledge that you believe it will rain that must 
give you inferential justification supporting that the picnic will be cancelled.  But why would 
the fact that an agent believes it will rain inferentially support that a picnic will be cancelled? 
The obvious answer is that it does so by supporting that it will rain.  But you already 
justifiably believe that it will rain, and the Cartesian denied that this can be what gives you 
justification to believe that the picnic will be cancelled!  The Cartesian about belief  thus has 
no apparent way of  explaining how knowledge of  your belief  that it will rain could give you 
inferential justification to believe that the picnic will be cancelled. 
Also like Cartesianism about perception, Cartesianism about belief  lends itself  to further 
views about whether you are justified in particular cases.  In particular, I think the Cartesian 
must accept a principle similar to PERCEPTUAL IMPARTIALITY.  In this respect, Cartesianism 
about belief  and perception are closely aligned.  So I will set aside the preceding objection, 
and focus on others with more immediate relevance to Cartesianism about perception. 
Consider an example: 
 Notice that on this Cartesian view, the higher-order knowledge that does the justifying is knowledge that you 15
have the belief, and not knowledge whether you hold the belief  justifiably, or whether it is supported by your 
first-order evidence.  I think this makes the view a better counterpart to traditional Cartesian views of  
perception, on which it is crucial that one’s evidence about one’s own perceptual states be limited to what can 
be known directly by introspection.  I take it that plausibly can achieve higher-order knowledge of  a belief  
directly via introspection, but not knowledge of  whether it is justified.  But in any case, some of  my objections 
will apply to Cartesian views that incorporate these other kinds of  higher-order knowledge.
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(TWO BELIEVERS) You and Other both know that the picnic will be 
cancelled if  it rains.  Right now, you both suspend judgment on whether it 
will rain.  But pretty soon, one of  you will learn first-order meteorological 
evidence that will lead you to settle on a belief.  You have strong but 
misleading higher-order evidence that you are highly unreliable at evaluating 
meteorological evidence, and you have equivalent higher-order evidence 
concerning Other.  (For example, you might have misleading evidence 
supporting that you are both impaired by drowsiness, hypoxia, or a drug.)  As 
a matter of  fact, whoever comes to hold a belief  will believe that it will rain. 
And despite this misleading higher-order evidence, you are in fact highly 
reliable, and the meteorological evidence supports this belief. 
First consider what we should say if  Other is the one who goes on to believe that it will rain. 
It should be uncontroversial that even if  you know that Other holds this belief, this 
knowledge will have little effect on your justification to believe that the picnic will be 
cancelled.  For unlike the more schematic TWO SPECTATORS and TWO PERCEIVERS, in TWO 
BELIEVERS it is stipulated that your higher-order evidence is unfavorable.  So even if  Other 
himself  has strong meteorological evidence supporting his belief  that it will rain, your 
evidence, including what you know about Other, will not support that it will rain.  And for 
this reason, you cannot plausibly be justified in believing either that it will rain or that the 
picnic will be cancelled. 
Now consider what the Cartesian must say if  you are the one who believes that it will rain. 
The Cartesian says that just as with Other, this puts you in the position of  having to infer 
whether the picnic will be cancelled from the evidence that you believe it will rain.  We have 
said that you would not be justified in doing so when your evidence is instead that Other 
holds this belief.  So it would seem irrationally chauvinistic for you to do so when you are 
the one who holds it.  For this would mean treating your own belief  as stronger evidence of  
the truth, even though your evidence about your own reliability and Other’s is equivalent. 
In short, the Cartesian about belief  must accept an impartiality principle similar to 
PERCEPTUAL IMPARTIALITY.  For reasons that will emerge shortly, it is worth considering a 
principle that, while no less plausibly a commitment of  Cartesianism, is stronger than what 
we considered for perception: 
(STRONG DOXASTIC IMPARTIALITY)  Holding a belief  can never have 
substantially stronger effects on your justification for other beliefs than 
would result from knowing that another person holds that belief. 
The Cartesian should accept STRONG DOXASTIC IMPARTIALITY because she says that 
regardless of  who holds a belief, its epistemic significance is exhausted by what can be 
inferred from the fact that the person holds is.  So if  the Cartesian allowed holding the 
belief  yourself  to have some further epistemic effect that knowing of  Other’s belief  does 
not have, then this would amount to licensing irrational chauvinism. 
The Cartesian therefore must claim that, if  you are the one who believes that it will rain, 
your holding this belief  will have little effect on your justification to believe that the picnic 
will be cancelled.  She must claim this because that is what we all should say when it is Other 
who holds this belief.  But this claim has potentially objectionable consequences. 
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The first is this:  The Cartesian must say that your belief  that it will rain itself  is unjustified, 
despite its being supported by your meteorological evidence.  For consider the plausible 
principle that for arbitrary p and q, 
(MODUS PONENS CLOSURE)  If  you justifiably believe that p and know that 
if  p then q, then you have justification to believe that q. 
If  you justifiably believed that it will rain, then by MODUS PONENS CLOSURE you would 
have justification to believe that the picnic will be cancelled.  But you would not have 
justification to believe that the picnic will be cancelled merely from knowing that Other 
believes it will rain.  So by accepting STRONG DOXASTIC IMPARTIALITY, the Cartesian is 
committed to saying that your belief  that it will rain is unjustified. 
Indeed, Cartesianism about belief  seems committed to calibrationism, a view with recent 
prominence in discussions of  peer disagreement and higher-evidence.   Although 16
calibrationist views can vary, the rough idea is that once you arrive at an initial first-order 
belief  in response to your first-order evidence, the all-things-considered justified doxastic 
attitude is the one best supported by your higher-order evidence about yourself, including 
the fact that you initially arrived at whatever belief  you did.  To see why the Cartesian must 
accept this strong form of  calibrationism, suppose to the contrary that having strong first-
order evidence that it will rain could give you stronger justification to believe that it will rain 
than you would get from the higher-order evidence alone.  This would mean that it gives you 
stronger justification than you would get from merely knowing that Other believes that it will 
rain, since concerning Other this higher-order evidence is your total evidence.  And if  you 
can have stronger justification to believe that it will rain, then this stronger justification to 
believe that it will rain should also result in stronger justification to believe that the picnic 
will be cancelled.  Thus we must accept calibrationism, or else accept the following: 
(DOXASTIC PARTIALITY) Holding a belief  can sometimes give you 
substantially stronger justification for other beliefs than you would get from 
mere knowledge that another person holds that belief.  17
Yet DOXASTIC PARTIALITY contradicts STRONG DOXASTIC IMPARTIALITY, which the 
Cartesian must accept.  The Cartesian thus has stronger calibrationist commitments than 
many philosophers are willing to accept. 
Of  course, while calibrationism remains controversial, many accept or at least defend it.  But 
I think even these philosophers should reject a second objectionable commitment of  
Cartesianism, which goes beyond anything calibrationists endorse.  For by STRONG 
 For sympathetic discussions of  calibrationism and the closely related equal weight view of  peer 16
disagreement, see, e.g., (Elga, 2007), (Christensen, 2010), (Sliwa and Horowitz, 2015) and (Vavova, 2014).  For 
critical discussions, see, e.g., (Kelly, 2010), (Lasonen-Aarnio, 2014), (Schoenfield, 2015), and (Weatherson, MS). 
Although I have endorsed a calibrationism-like view regarding external sources of  information (Barnett, 2014), 
I was careful not to extend it to one’s own beliefs and experiences.
 Here I assume that if  we reject calibrationism, then it is the justified belief  that it will rain which justifies the 17
belief  that the picnic will be cancelled.  But Alex Worsnip suggests that there might be room for a distinct view 
holding that it is the meteorological evidence itself  which justified the belief  that the picnic will be cancelled. 
Although this view is incompatible with calibrationism and Cartesianism about belief, perhaps it can reject 
DOXASTIC PARTIALITY.  But note that even if  so, this view would not allow us to avoid the weaker principle 
WEAK DOXASTIC PARTIALITY, which I discuss below.
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DOXASTIC IMPARTIALITY, the Cartesian must claim that your belief  that it will rain does not 
in any way affect your justification concerning whether the picnic will be cancelled.  So let us 
grant for the sake of  argument the calibrationist claim that your belief  that it will rain is 
unjustified.  As we will now see, the Cartesian’s claim is objectionable even if  so. 
Start with the common observation that agent with logically incoherent doxastic attitudes are 
guilty of  irrationality, at least barring exceptional circumstances.   For example, consider an 18
agent who believes that p, and who knows that if  p then q, but who nevertheless believes 
that not-q.  This agent manifests irrationality by holding these inconsistent beliefs.  Consider 
also an agent who believes that p, and who knows that if  p then q, but who nevertheless 
suspends judgment on whether q.  This agent, too, manifests irrationality in suspending 
judgment on an obvious consequence of  other things she believes.  19
Similarly, if  one believes that it will rain in TWO BELIEVERS, then one manifests irrationality 
by suspending judgment or disbelieving that the picnic will be cancelled.  For this reason, I 
think these doxastic attitudes could not be justified, so long as you believe that it will rain. 
That is, so long as you believe it will rain, you could not justifiably disbelieve that the picnic 
will be cancelled.  Nor could you justifiably suspend judgment on whether the picnic will be 
cancelled.  To be sure, if  calibrationists are right that your belief  that it will rain is itself  
unjustified, then you furthermore could not justifiably believe that the picnic will be 
cancelled!  But that does not mean that other doxastic attitudes would be justified.  Instead, 
it means that you are in a low-grade epistemic tragedy, in which no possible doxastic attitude 
is justified, so long as you retain your belief  that it will rain.  (I call it ‘low-grade’ because you 
have a way out:  giving up your unjustified belief  that it will rain.) 
In making these claims about the epistemic effects of  even unjustified beliefs, I commit 
myself  to a principle like the following: 
(NARROW-SCOPE MODUS PONENS)  If  you believe that p and know that if  p 
then q, then you are rationally required to believe that q. 
Here I understand the notion of  rational requirement in the following semi-stipulative way: 
You are rationally required to believe that q iff  you cannot justifiably hold any doxastic 
attitude to q other than belief.  (If  there can be at least low-grade epistemic tragedies, being 
rationally required to hold a belief  is not sufficient for having justification for it.  Whether 
rational requirement is necessary for justification is a controversial matter, closely related to 
whether rationality is permissive. ) 20
There are two differences between NARROW-SCOPE MODUS PONENS and the more familiar 
MODUS PONENS CLOSURE.  First, NARROW-SCOPE MODUS PONENS is missing a deontic 
operator in the antecedent.  Satisfying the antecedent requires believing that p, but not 
justifiably believing that p.  Second, the condition specified in the consequent has been 
 See, e.g., (Lasonen-Aarnio, 2008) and (Schechter, 2013) for recent discussion of  circumstances where 18
coherence requirements allegedly fail.  I think these and other problems critics have raised for coherence 
requirements are orthogonal to the present discussion.
 Here I take suspended judgment to be a positive doxastic attitude.  One does not qualify as suspending 19
judgment if  one has never settled on an attitude, for example if  one has never considered the matter.
 See, e.g., (White, 2005) and (Schoenfield, 2014).20
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(arguably) weakened.  It would be implausible to hold that merely believing that p (while 
knowing if  p then q) is sufficient for having justification to believe that q.  For that would 
mean that an agent who believes he is Napoleon (and who has some basic historical 
knowledge) has justification to believe that he was defeated at Waterloo.  Instead, NARROW-
SCOPE MODUS PONENS says only that cannot justifiably hold a doxastic attitude to q other 
than belief.  So it means, for example, that one who believes he is Napoleon, and who knows 
that if  so he was defeated at Waterloo, cannot justifiably believe that he was not defeated at 
Waterloo. 
The Cartesian about belief  must deny that unjustified beliefs can have these downstream 
epistemic effects that I have been suggesting.  We have already observed that when Other is 
the one who believes that it will rain, knowing of  Other’s belief  would not give you 
justification to believe that the picnic will be cancelled.  For by stipulation, your evidence 
supports that Other is unreliable.  But similarly, knowing of  Other’s belief  would not 
prevent you from justifiably holding other doxastic attitudes to whether the picnic will be 
cancelled, such as suspended judgment. 
To be sure, even though these considerations give us reason to reject Cartesianism about 
belief, they do not get us all the way to DOXASTIC PARTIALITY, which speaks to justification 
rather than rational requirement.  But it does get us to the contradictory of  STRONG 
DOXASTIC IMPARTIALITY, namely: 
(WEAK DOXASTIC PARTIALITY)  Holding a belief  can sometimes have 
substantially stronger effects on your justification for other beliefs than 
would result from knowing that another person holds that belief. 
The upshot is that the Cartesian, who is committed to STRONG DOXASTIC IMPARTIALITY, 
must deny that believing it will rain prevents you from justifiably suspending judgment or 
disbelieving that the picnic will be cancelled. 
Now it might seem that in denying this, the Cartesian is in good company.  For the epistemic 
significance of  unjustified belief  has been the subject of  considerable controversy in recent 
debates between wide- and narrow-scopers about rational requirements.   The wide-scopers 21
claim that it is a mistake to think of  rationality as requiring particular attitudes in the way 
NARROW-SCOPE MODUS PONENS alleges.  These philosophers instead opt for wide-scope 
requirements like: 
(WIDE-SCOPE MODUS PONENS)  Rationality requires that (if  you believe that 
p and know that if  p then q, then you believe that q). 
Now I admit that WIDE-SCOPE MODUS PONENS might not have the straightforward 
implications for justification that NARROW-SCOPE MODUS PONENS does.  Justification is an 
evaluative notion typically applied to particular attitudes, and it is perhaps up for grabs what 
implications wide-scope requirements should have for the evaluation of  particular attitudes. 
Presumably we should at least say that if  a set of  attitudes jointly violate a wide-scope 
requirement, then at least one of  them is unjustified.  But the Cartesian can allow this.  For 
she holds that your belief  that it will rain is unjustified, independently of  whether you violate 
any wide-scope requirements with your attitude to whether the picnic will be cancelled. 
 See, e.g., (Broome, 1999 and 2013), (Kolodny, 2005),(Lord, 2014), and (Worsnip, 2015).21
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Yet it is at least plausible, even if  we opt for wide-scoping, that the violation of  a rational 
requirement can impugn the justification of  otherwise justified beliefs.  In particular, if  you 
believe that it will rain in TWO BELIEVERS, then plausibly you cannot justifiably believe that 
the picnic will not be cancelled, even if  you otherwise have good reason to believe this.  And 
it is furthermore plausible that you could not justifiably suspend judgment about whether it 
will be cancelled.  These claims have an independent intuitive plausibility, even if  we opt for 
a view about rational requirements that does not straightforwardly entail them. 
It is time to take stock.  Cartesianism about belief  is in bad shape.  And if  we adopt anti-
Cartesianism about belief, that opens the door for anti-Cartesianism about perceptual 
experience as well.  To be sure, anti-Cartesianism about belief  does not straightforwardly 
entail anti-Cartesianism about perceptual experience.  For it could be that beliefs and 
perceptual experiences simply differ epistemically.  Coherentists, for example, often stress 
what they see as fundamental differences between belief  and experience in supporting their 
claim that the only thing that could justify a belief  is another belief.  But recent anti-
Cartesians reply by stressing what they see as important similarities.  Like belief, these anti-
Cartesians claim, perceptual experiences have representational content.  And also like belief, 
but unlike other states with representational content like desires, perceptual experiences in 
some sense present their representational content as being true.   For this reason, it is 22
plausible that perceptual experiences, like beliefs, partially determine what one’s apparent 
evidence is.  I take this to strengthen attempts to deflect the charge of  chauvinism that we 
considered at the end of  Section 2 above. 
These are difficult matters, and I will not try to adjudicate them here.  Instead, my aim is 
simply to note that to the extent that we are attracted to anti-Cartesianism about experience 
because of  these apparent similarities between perceptual experiences and beliefs, we will 
have reason to accept PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY.  This is because our main motivations for 
rejecting Cartesianism about belief  appealed to corresponding partiality principles, 
DOXASTIC PARTIALITY and WEAK DOXASTIC PARTIALITY.  Now it is true that WEAK 
DOXASTIC PARTIALITY differs from PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY.  For WEAK DOXASTIC 
PARTIALITY says merely that your beliefs can affect your justification in ways that another 
person’s do not, and not that your beliefs do so specifically by giving you justification for 
beliefs that another person’s does not.  But the reason why narrow-scoping supported only 
this weaker partiality principle for belief  is because of  the distinction between rational 
requirement and justification.  The distinction is important in the case of  belief, because the 
unjustified belief  that it will rain can rationally require you to believe that the picnic will be 
cancelled even though it does not justify you in doing so.  But I think that it is unlikely that 
the distinction between justifying and rationally requiring a belief  will be of  similar 
importance when it comes to experience.  Since experiences cannot be unjustified in the first 
place, it is not clear that an experience could rationally require a perceptual belief  without 
thereby justifying it.   And so an anti-Cartesianism about experience, if  modeled on anti-23
 For helpful discussion of  these issues, see (Pryor, 2005).22
 Those with worries about the cognitive penetrability of  perception—e.g., (Siegel 2012 and 2013)—might 23
think it is possible for perceptual experiences to be epistemically defective in some broader way that makes 
them unsuitable to justify a perceptual belief  even when they require it.  But even if  so, I think this will not 
substantially affect the main thread of  our discussion.  The problem for anti-Cartesianism that I present in 
Section 4 could arguably be recast in terms of  requirements rather than justifications, or even simply be 
restricted to cases in which it is stipulated that the perceptual states in question are not epistemically defective.
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Cartesianism about belief  that accepts either DOXASTIC PARTIALITY or WEAK DOXASTIC 
PARTIALITY, should accept PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY. 
4.  A Problem for Anti-Cartesianism 
Let’s consider the big picture.  According to the traditional Cartesian epistemology of  
perception, one’s perceptual beliefs are justified if  at all by inferences from known premises 
about one’s perceptual experiences.  But anti-Cartesians say that perceptual states themselves 
can provide one with perceptual justification to a degree that cannot be accounted for in this 
way.  This allows anti-Cartesians to accept PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY without obvious 
chauvinism, unlike Cartesians.  And indeed, the core motivations for anti-Cartesianism also 
support PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY, meaning that the anti-Cartesian cannot avail herself  of  
these motivations without also accepting PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY. 
What remains to be seen is whether there is some subtler way in which accepting 
PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY ultimately commits the anti-Cartesian to licensing objectionable 
chauvinism or some other sort of  irrationality.  And it is here that I think the anti-Cartesian 
faces a problem.  So although in my view the motivations for rejecting Cartesianism are 
powerful, there also is a powerful objection to any form of  anti-Cartesianism that can avail 
itself  of  these motivations by accepting PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY.  The Cartesian analogy 
between ordinary perception and a Cartesian theater, despite its many difficulties, is not 
easily dispensed with. 
The problem for anti-Cartesianism arises from the fact that just as you can know about 
another person’s experiences, you also can know about the experiences that you had in the 
past, or that you will have in the future.  Consider an example: 
(ANTICIPATED EXPERIENCE) Shortly before noon, you are wearing a 
blindfold and facing a wall.  You know that at noon, the blindfold will be 
removed, and that when it is, you will have an experience as of  a red wall. 
What should the anti-Cartesian say about the epistemic significance of  knowing that you will 
have a reddish experience at noon?  Is it epistemically akin to knowing that another person 
has a reddish experience?  Or is it more like actually having the experience now?  For a more 
precise formulation of  this question, let’s call the justification that the anti-Cartesian says 
that you get from actually having an experience your proprietary justification.  (That is, the 
proprietary justification is whatever you get in excess of  what you would get from knowing 
that another person had such an experience.)   The question at hand is whether knowing 
about your own future experiences gives you proprietary justification now for perceptual 
beliefs. 
There are strong prima facie motivations for thinking that the anti-Cartesian cannot allow 
knowledge of  one’s future experiences to give one proprietary justification now.  For it 
would seem that the only way this knowledge could justify you in believing that the wall is 
red is by allowing you to justifiably infer that the wall is red from the premise that you will 
have a reddish experience at noon.  And it would be illegitimately chauvinistic to infer that 
the wall is red from this premise unless you also would be willing to infer the same 
conclusion from the premise that Other will have a reddish experience at noon.  Thus the 
anti-Cartesian cannot say that knowledge of  one’s own future experience gives one 
proprietary justification for believing that the wall is red any more than the Cartesian was 
able to say this for knowledge of  one’s own present experiences. 
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Now I am not entirely sure that this prima facie motivation should be accepted, as I will 
explain in Section 4.2 below.  But let us for now suppose that it is, and see the problem that 
this raises for the anti-Cartesian.  The anti-Cartesian accepts PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY, and 
thus says that having a reddish experience now can give you proprietary justification for 
believing that the wall is red—justification that can be stronger than what you would get 
from merely knowing that another person has or will have a reddish experience.  But merely 
knowing that you will have a reddish experience yourself  in a few minutes does not give you 
that kind of  proprietary justification right now.  The anti-Cartesian must therefore claim that 
even when you know in advance that you will have a reddish experience at noon, when noon 
arrives and you actually have that reddish experience, this will give you stronger justification 
than you had to begin with. 
The problem for the anti-Cartesian is that this final claim licenses a way of  updating one’s 
beliefs and credences that seems to manifest diachronic irrationality.  For suppose that 
before noon you withhold belief  that the wall is red, even though you know that at noon the 
wall will look red to you.  It seems irrational for you suddenly to be convinced that the wall 
is red once your blindfold is removed and you seem to see a red wall.  You knew that this 
would happen!  More generally, it seems irrational for you to substantially increase your 
confidence at noon that the wall is red, merely because you are having the very experience 
that you knew in advance you would have.  But if  the anti-Cartesian were right that your 
degree of  justification for believing the wall is red increases substantially at noon, then it 
would be rational for you to substantially increase your confidence that the wall is red.  If  it 
isn’t, the anti-Cartesian must be wrong. 
The anti-Cartesian has a number of  possible responses to this apparent problem.  But 
before considering these options, I want to say briefly why this problem for anti-
Cartesianism is more general and less avoidable than two more familiar objections to 
particular versions of  anti-Cartesianism. 
First consider a prominent Bayesian objection to certain versions of  dogmatism, which 
embrace a Moorean reply to skepticism.   These Moorean dogmatists hold that one’s 24
experiences can give one justification to believe that one is not in a skeptical scenario, even 
when one’s being in the skeptical scenario would entail that one has those very experiences. 
For example, where BIV is the proposition that one is a brain in a vat who has a non-
veridical reddish experience, and RED is the proposition that one has a reddish experience, 
the Moorean holds than having a reddish experience can justify one in rejecting BIV even 
though BIV entails RED.  The familiar Bayesian objection to this claim appeals to the 
theorem of  the probability calculus that if  BIV entails RED, then Pr(~BIV|RED) ≤ 
Pr(~BIV).  The objection says that since one’s prior conditional probability for ~BIV given 
RED can be no higher than one’s prior unconditional probability for RED, having a reddish 
experience cannot give you justification to believe that ~BIV. 
This is an important objection to the Moorean reply to skepticism.  But the relationship 
between anti-Cartesianism an the Moorean reply is slippery.  Not only might anti-Cartesians 
 See (White, 2006) for a canonical presentation of  this objection to Pryor’s (2000) dogmatism, as well as other 24
objections.
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reject the Moorean reply,  Cartesians might embrace it.   And even if  the anti-Cartesian 25 26
does embrace the Moorean reply, she has available several plausible responses to the 
Bayesian objection.   Here I will merely highlight my preferred response, which has been 27
discussed in depth by Luca Moratti (2015).  The response holds that just because Pr(~BIV|
RED) ≤ Pr(~BIV), that does not mean that having a reddish experience cannot confer 
justification for believing ~BIV.  For it denies that the epistemic significance of  having a 
reddish experience is exhausted by one’s conditionalizing on the proposition that one has it. 
Anti-Cartesians should be prepared to deny this.  For conditionalizing on a proposition is a 
close cousin of  making inferences from one’s knowledge of  that proposition.  And the anti-
Cartesian’s core idea is that the epistemic significance of  having an experience is not 
exhausted by what can be inferred from the proposition that one has it. 
Consider now a second familiar objection.  This objection concerns externalist forms of  
anti-Cartesianism like epistemological disjunctivism.  These externalist views claim that the 
factive state of  seeing can give one perceptual knowledge even when merely seeming to see 
the same thing would fail to even give one justification for a perceptual belief.  The prima facie 
problem for these views is that they have the counterintuitive implication that one who 
unwittingly hallucinates a red wall is unjustified in believing that the wall before her is red. 
But externalists have tried to explain away the intuition that such an agent is justified by 
distinguishing between justification and blamelessness.   Sure enough, they say, such an 28
agent is blameless in believing that the wall is red.  But this kind of  blamelessness is not 
sufficient for justification.  However, the problem that I raise for anti-Cartesianism instead 
only requires blamelessness to be necessary for justification.  This is because it charges anti-
Cartesianism with licensing as justified a way of  updating one’s beliefs that is positively 
blameworthy.  So long as blamelessness is necessary for justification, this updating procedure 
could not yield justified belief, as the anti-Cartesian is apparently committed to claiming.  So 
even though these externalist forms of  anti-Cartesianism are not our main focus, I think the 
problem I raise is more pressing for them than this familiar problem. 
It is time now to consider an anti-Cartesian’s options for responding to the problem I have 
just raised.  In Section 4.1, I will consider the prospects for biting the bullet, and accepting 
that one gains justification at noon to believe that the wall is red.  In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, I 
will consider two ways that the anti-Cartesian might try to avoid the commitment to saying 
this.  Finally, in Section 4.4  I will explain why the anti-Cartesian who wishes to hang on to 
PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY has no further options remaining. 
4.1  First Option:  Biting the Bullet 
Can the anti-Cartesian bite the bullet, and accept that at noon you gain additional 
justification for believing the wall is red? 
 E.g., (Silins, 2008).25
 E.g., (Vogel, 2014).26
 E.g., (Cohen, 2010), (Jehle and Weatherson, 2012), (Kung, 2010), (Moretti, 2015), (Pryor, MS and 2013), 27
(Vogel, 2014), and (Weatherson, 2007).
 See, e.g.,  (Littlejohn, 2012) and (Pritchard, 2012).  And see (Miracchi, forthcoming) for helpful critical 28
discussion, as well as an alternative externalist proposal.
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Here is one defense of  biting the bullet:  Any view about perception must say something 
unappealing at some point.  And what the anti-Cartesian says here, while counterintuitive, is 
less bad than what alternative views must say elsewhere. 
In my view, this is the best defense of  biting the bullet.  I now consider some other defenses, 
which attempt to make biting the bullet seem more appealing than I have made it out to be. 
I think these fail. 
The first grants that your degree of  justification increases at noon, but denies that this 
licenses an irrational updating procedure.  It says:  Simply because your degree of  
justification increases, that does not mean your degree of  confidence ought to increase. 
I admit that there might be different ways of  understanding talk of  degrees of  justification, 
perhaps some of  which divorce the notion from rational degrees of  confidence.  And 
perhaps on some of  these, it could be plausible that your degree of  justification increases at 
noon.  For example, perhaps you gain a more direct kind of  knowledge at noon that the wall 
is red, even if  you rationally had high confidence already.  But I think that the anti-Cartesian 
is in no position to fall back on a notion of  degrees of  justification that divorces it from 
rational degrees of  confidence.  For this would undermine the strongest motivations for 
anti-Cartesianism.  Consider, for example, the anti-skeptical advantage over the Cartesian. 
The anti-Cartesian could not claim this advantage if  our perceptual experiences merely gave 
us a kind of  proprietary justification that affects the strength of  our justification for 
perceptual beliefs, without also permitting us to place more confidence in them.  This kind 
of  proprietary justification would do nothing to help us respond to the skeptical challenge 
that we are irrational for being as confident as we are that we have hands.  If  we were 
worried that our perceptual beliefs, despite being rational and true, were merely deficient in 
some further way, then perhaps PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY could still be of  assistance.  But it 
is unclear what that further worry would be, and it does not seem to be the core skeptical 
challenge that anti-Cartesians have traditionally taken their view to help us overcome. 
Another defense of  biting the bullet holds that even if  you know in advance that you will 
have a reddish experience, you can never be quite certain.  But when you actually have a 
reddish experience at noon, then you can be certain.  As a result, you can be more confident 
that the wall is red. 
I admit that this this defense gives a plausible explanation of  why your confidence might 
justifiably increase slightly at noon.  Indeed, it is one even Cartesians could accept.  For 
plausibly, even when one knows some evidence e that inferentially supports p, this is 
compatible with one having some room for doubt about e and thus about p as well.  And so 
it is plausible that increasing one’s degree of  certainty in e beyond a minimum threshold 
required for knowledge might increase one’s degree of  confidence in p at least slightly. 
Even so, I think this defense cannot plausibly explain why one’s degree of  confidence for p 
could rationally increase more than slightly.  If  one knows that e, then one has at most a little 
room for doubt about e.  So there will be little room for one’s degree of  certainty in e to 
increase, and thus little room for one’s confidence in p to increase as a result of  an increase 
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in the certainty of  e.   This is important, because the anti-Cartesian proponent of  29
PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY needs to say that one’s confidence that the wall is red can increase 
substantially at noon.  For this too is essential for anti-Cartesianism’s strongest motivations. 
For example, if  having an experience offered only a slight increase in the strength of  one’s 
justification relative to what one would get from knowing about another person’s experience, 
then the anti-Cartesian would have very limited anti-skeptical advantages over Cartesianism. 
For whatever the strength of  our justification for perceptual beliefs might be under 
Cartesianism, the anti-Cartesian would be able to offer us only slightly more.  That would be 
reassuring only if  the skeptical worry was merely that we fall just slightly short of  being 
justified in our perceptual beliefs!  To to have a noteworthy anti-skeptical advantage, 
therefore, the anti-Cartesian must claim that the proprietary justification conferred by one’s 
experiences is substantial.  For this reason, I do not think that biting the bullet is made any 
more palatable by the slight increase in certainty about one’s experience that might come 
when it actually happens. 
4.2  Second Option:  Licensing Chauvinism 
A second option for the anti-Cartesian is to claim that when you know of  your own future 
experience, that gives you stronger justification than you would get from knowing of  another 
person’s experience.  If  this is granted, then in ANTICIPATED EXPERIENCE you might 
already enjoy this stronger justification before noon, and consequently receive no additional 
reason to believe that the wall is red at noon.  The apparent problem with this claim is that it 
seems to license an irrational form of  chauvinism.  For it seems to license one in counting 
one’s own future experiences as stronger evidence than another person’s, even in the absence 
of  evidence that one’s experiences are objectively more reliable. 
It might be claimed that there is a way to avoid this kind of  flagrant chauvinism.  One 
strategy might be to claim that it can be rational to count one’s own experiences as stronger 
evidence of  the truth, even in the absence of  evidence that one’s experiences are objectively 
more reliable.  For example, one might claim in the style of  Crispin Wright (2004) that we 
have non-evidential reasons for believing that our own experiences are a reliable guide to the 
truth—e.g., because the pursuit of  our intellectual projects requires us to accept that our 
own experiences are reliable, but not that other people’s experiences are.   Another strategy 30
might be to claim that even if  it would be irrational to count one’s own future experiences as 
stronger evidence than another person’s, this is not the only way that knowledge of  one’s 
future experiences to give one proprietary justification for perceptual beliefs.  Perhaps if  I 
know that I will have a reddish experience in just a moment, I don’t need to infer that the 
wall is red from this evidence.  Maybe it could somehow just make my future proprietary 
justification available to me now, as if  I were already having the experience.  31
 Although I take this point to be intuitively plausible, it can be reinforced by the familiar theorem of  the 29
probability calculus that Pr(p) = Pr(p|e)Pr(e) + Pr(p|~e)Pr(~e).  Since Pr(p|~e)Pr(~e) ≥ 0, this theorem 
entails that Pr(p) ≥ Pr(p|e)Pr(e).  So when for some 𝛿, Pr(e) = 1 - 𝛿, it follows that Pr(p) ≥ Pr(p|e)(1 - 𝛿), and 
thus that Pr(p) ≥ Pr(p|e) - Pr(p|e)𝛿.  And since 𝛿 ≥ 0 and Pr(p|e) ≤ 1, this means that Pr(p) ≥ Pr(p|e) - 𝛿. 
Roughly put, the upshot is that Pr(p) can be less than Pr(p|e) only to whatever extent Pr(e) is less than 1.
 Note, however, that the Cartesian might avail himself  of  this, too, in an attempt to accept PERCEPTUAL 30
PARTIALITY.
 This strategy is inspired by (Pryor, 2013).31
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But even if  these or other responses give us plausible theoretical rationales for why knowledge 
of  one’s own future experiences can give one proprietary justification right now, they are 
forced to embrace counterintuitive consequences.  Consider: 
(TWO PERCEIVERS SEQUEL) All is as before in the TWO PERCEIVERS case. 
Then, before any blindfolds are removed, you learn some additional 
information.  Without being told whether you or Other will be the agent 
whose blindfold is removed, you are informed that whoever has their 
blindfold removed will have an experience as of  a red wall.  A few minutes 
pass, and you are given the further information that you will be the one 
whose blindfold is removed. 
When you learn that the agent whose blindfold is removed will have a reddish experience, 
this might give you some justification to believe that the wall is red.  How much justification 
it gives you can vary, depending on how we fill in further details of  the case.  For although 
we have said that your evidence concerning the reliability of  your own experiences is on a 
par with your evidence concerning Other’s, we have left it open precisely what this evidence 
includes.  But it also seems that no matter how we fill in these additional details, you will not 
get any additional justification to believe that the wall is red once you learn that it is you 
whose blindfold will be removed. 
The anti-Cartesian who takes the second option must say otherwise.  But this too licenses an 
updating procedure that is intuitively hard to accept as rational, in this case on account of  its 
apparent chauvinism.  For consider your situation once you know that someone will have a 
reddish experience, but before you learn that it will be you.  If  at this stage you withhold 
belief  concerning the color of  the wall, it would seem irrational for you then to grant belief  
once you learn that it will be you who has the reddish experience.  More generally, it seems 
irrationally chauvinistic for you to increase your confidence that the wall is red when you 
learn it is you who has the reddish experience.  For your evidence concerning Other’s 
perceptual reliability and your own are equivalent. 
Thus, even if  the anti-Cartesian can in this way avoid saying that your justification increases 
at noon in ANTICIPATED EXPERIENCE, she has a different bullet to bite:  licensing 
chauvinism.  To be sure, just as with saying that your justification increases at noon, the 
problem with licensing chauvinism is not that the anti-Cartesian lacks a theory that can explain 
why this sort of  chauvinism is rational.  The problem is that it seems false that this sort of  
chauvinism is rational.  Yet any view that takes knowledge of  one’s own future experiences 
to provide proprietary justification is bound to say otherwise. 
4.3  Third Option:  Rejecting Evidentialism about Defeaters 
Recall that PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY says that having an experience sometimes gives you a 
distinctive proprietary justification for a perceptual belief.  It need not say that it does so all 
the time.  The final response for the anti-Cartesian is to claim that your reddish experience in 
ANTICIPATED EXPERIENCE does not confer proprietary justification, even though in other 
cases your experiences can do so.  An anti-Cartesian who takes this option owes us a story 
about what feature of  the ANTICIPATED EXPERIENCE case prevents you from receiving 
proprietary justification from your experience.  This seems tough to do.  For the feature 
would need to be an essential feature of  the case, or else the case could simply be modified 
to remove it.  And it would need to be a feature that is plausibly absent in many ordinary 
cases of  perception, or else anti-Cartesianism will lose its anti-skeptical force.  It seems that 
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the only feature fitting the bill is that in ANTICIPATED EXPERIENCE you have reflective 
awareness of  your experience.  For it is essential to the example that you know that you 
have a reddish experience at noon.  And it is not clear that we ordinarily do know what our 
experiences are, even though we are able to come to know what they are if  we stop to 
reflect.  So the final option for the anti-Cartesian is to claim that this reflective awareness 
alone is enough to defeat the distinctive proprietary justification that those experiences 
otherwise would give you for perceptual beliefs. 
To be clear, the idea is not that reflective awareness defeats any justification you might have 
for believing that the wall is red.  Given the right background evidence, you can infer from 
the fact that Other seems to see a red wall that the wall is red, and you presumably can be in 
an equally good position to make such an inference from knowledge of  your own 
experiences.  Rather, the idea is that reflective awareness undermines the distinctive sort of  
proprietary justification that your experiences usually can provide. 
Although I am more sympathetic than most are to this third option for anti-Cartesianism, it 
faces objections.  After considering one objection that does not impress me much, I will 
consider another objection that is in my view stronger. 
The objection that does not impress me appeals to an assumption that nothing you can do 
“from the armchair” can change your epistemic position.  According to this assumption, the 
only thing that can change your epistemic position is gathering up new evidence using 
sensory perception.  Things you do from the armchair, like reasoning through the 
consequences of  your existing evidence, or reflecting on your existing mental states, can only 
help you to achieve justified beliefs about things that you already had justification to believe. 
If  you are able to arrive at a justified belief  just by reasoning through your existing evidence, 
then that means that you already had (propositional) justification for that belief, even before 
you did the reasoning.  And the same goes, according to the objection, for another thing you 
do from the armchair:  reflecting on your existing mental states, like your existing 
experiences.  If  this is right, then merely reflecting on your current experiences cannot give 
you a new defeater for your perceptual beliefs, since it cannot change your epistemic position 
at all. 
I am sympathetic to the objection’s contention that reasoning through the consequences of  
your existing evidence cannot change your epistemic position.  But I think that reflection (or 
introspection) often changes your epistemic position—i.e., that it is a way of  gathering up 
new evidence that you did not already have, even though it is a kind of  evidence-gathering 
that can be done from the armchair.  An example might help to reinforce the point. 
Suppose I ask you “How many states have names beginning with the letter ‘M’?”  If  you 
know the names of  all the states, then it seems that there is an important sense in which the 
answer to this question is already among the things implicitly built in to your current 
evidence.  So when you reason through this evidence to a justified belief, it is plausible that 
you are merely coming to believe something you already were in a position to justifiably 
believe.  But suppose I instead ask you “How many states remind you of  your 
grandmother?”  You might be able to determine the answer without getting out of  your 
armchair.  But you would have to do so through a process of  internal experimentation and 
observation that plausibly involves acquiring new evidence.   This does not mean that every 32
 Thanks to Jim Pryor (2013) for a helpful amendment to this example.32
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case of  reflection changes your epistemic position in the same way.  But it does speak against 
a general ban on reflection ever changing your epistemic position. 
Now for the objection that I think is more serious.  Instead of  claiming that reflection 
cannot give you new evidence, this objection says simply that the evidence that you do gain 
is not a defeater for your perceptual belief.  The objection appeals to a widely accepted 
evidentialist model of  defeaters, which holds that defeaters must take the form of  evidence 
that directly or indirectly speaks against the truth of  what you believe.  More precisely, the 
idea is that for one’s awareness that d to give one a defeater for the belief  that p, the fact that 
d must either oppose one’s belief  by directly supporting that p is false, or else undermine 
one’s existing evidence for the belief  by supporting that that evidence does not really 
support that p (or something to that general effect).  33
If  we accept this evidentialist model of  defeaters, then we apparently cannot allow reflective 
awareness that you have a reddish experience to give you a defeater for your belief  that the 
wall is red.  For the fact that you have a reddish experience will not in ordinary cases amount 
to evidence directly supporting that the wall is not red.  Nor will it in any obvious way 
amount to evidence that your existing evidence fails to support that the wall is red.  To be 
sure, there are difficulties in applying the usual model of  undermining defeaters, which is on 
its home turf  concerning beliefs which are justified by indirect evidence, to putatively non-
inferentially justified perceptual beliefs.  But roughly and approximately, it seems the 
proponent of  the evidentialist model should require an undermining defeater for a 
perceptual belief  to take the form of  evidence that one’s experiences do not provide a good 
guide to the external world (or something to that general effect).  The fact that one has taken 
a hallucinogenic drug might be an example of  such a defeater.  But the mere fact that one 
has a reddish experience typically is not. 
Now I have some sympathy for an anti-Cartesianism that denies this evidentialist model of  
defeaters.  But I think that anyone who takes this option owes us a positive explanation of  
how reflective awareness of  one’s experiences can defeat one’s proprietary justification even 
without providing one with undermining evidence.  Again, I do not take this option to be a 
non-starter, as many apparently do.  But it is a difficult task to offer a satisfying explanation 
of  how it can be accepted.  34
4.4  Conclusion 
Any kind of  anti-Cartesianism worth having will allow us to accept PERCEPTUAL 
PARTIALITY, for without it the core motivations for anti-Cartesianism are lost.  But in 
accepting PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY, the anti-Cartesian faces serious objections stemming 
from one’s possible knowledge of  one’s own future experiences.  One option is to simply 
 See, e.g., (Weatherson, Ms., Sec. 2.1) for a recent discussion of  defeaters along these lines.33
 As Karl Schafer has emphasized to me, an anti-Cartesian who takes this third option furthermore appears 34
committed to a major concession to the skeptic.  Since one will have distinctive proprietary justification for 
one’s perceptual beliefs only so long as one is not reflectively aware of  them, one will not be justified in one’s 
perceptual beliefs in contexts where one is reflectively aware of  them.  I think it is not obvious whether this 
concedes too much to the skeptic, and I will not attempt to settle the matter here.  Instead, I will note only that 
this concession to skepticism is not too far off  from those of  prominent contextualist and subject-sensitive 
invariantist responses to skepticism, which concede in different ways the truth of  skepticism in certain kinds of  
reflective contexts.
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bite the bullet, and claim that even when one knows of  an experience in advance, one gets 
stronger justification for a perceptual belief  once one actually has the experience.  Another is 
to license the seemingly chauvinistic practice of  increasing your confidence that the wall is 
red upon learning that you will have a reddish experience at noon, even when you already 
knew that either you or Other would have such an experience.  The final option is to reject 
evidentialism about defeaters, and claim that merely being reflectively aware of  your 
experiences must defeat the proprietary justification that they otherwise provide. 
Does the anti-Cartesian have any other options?  No.  For if  we reject the third option, then 
we will say that an unreflective agent who has a reddish experience has no more justification 
to believe the wall is red than does an agent who has reflective awareness of  her reddish 
experience.  And if  we reject the first option, then we will say that such a reflective agent, 
who has a reddish experience and who knows she has had it, has no more justification than 
an agent who knows that she will have a reddish experience but who has not had it yet.  And 
if  we reject the second option, then we will say that such an agent, who knows that she will 
have a reddish experience but who has not had it yet, has no more justification than does an 
agent who knows that someone else has had a reddish experience.  So if  we reject all three 
options, then it follows that an unreflective agent who has had a reddish experience has no 
more justification to believe that the wall is red than does an agent who merely knows that 
someone else has had such an experience—in direct contradiction of  PERCEPTUAL 
PARTIALITY.  Since the most appealing and well-motivated forms of  anti-Cartesianism 
accept PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY, it seems that the rejection of  a Cartesian epistemology of  
perception brings with it some difficult choices.  35
 For helpful comments and discussion, I am grateful to Paul Boghossian, Earl Conee, Sinan Dogramaci, 35
Hilary Kornblith, Ram Neta, Jim Pryor, Karl Schafer, Miriam Schoenfield, David Sosa, Katia Vavova, Alex 
Worsnip, and audiences at the University of  Massachusetts Amherst, the University of  Toronto, the University 
of  Texas at Austin, Mount Holyoke College, and the Creighton Club meeting at Syracuse University.
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